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NOTES

primarily liable because by the very terms of the unlimited escape clause the policy containing it could not constitute other
valid and collectible insurance. Such a holding would have been
consistent with the understanding and clear intent of the Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission.
Jarrell E. Godfrey, Jr.

JUDICIAL SALES -

THE PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE'S EFFECT
ON RADICAL NULLITIES

Plaintiff, a posthumous child born in 1941, brought a petitory
action in 1963 to recover his forced portion of his father's succession. He sought to set aside the 1940 succession sale of the
immovable property of the estate, alleging that his co-heirs
fraudulently had the property appraised at less than one-half
its value and purchased it for less than two-thirds the appraised
value. The co-heirs and bona fide third-party purchasers of some
of the property were joined as defendants. The trial court sustained defendants' exception of five-year curative prescription
applied to judicial sales by Civil Code article 3543.1 On appeal,
held, reversed. Since the property was sold not only for less than
two-thirds its appraised value, but also for less than its actual
value, the succession sale was an absolute nullity. Prescription
under article 3543 was not available even to subsequent purchasers for it was apparent in the public records that a just
price had not been obtained. Bordelon v. Bordelon, 180 So. 2d
855 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
Louisiana has effected a blend of Anglo-American and civil
law in dealing with errors in judicial sales. The doctrine of
informality, as opposed to radical error, is a common-law concept used to protect the stranger who purchases at a judicial
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3543 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1932, No. 231;
La. Acts 1960, No. 407, § 1. All informalities of legal procedure connected with
or growing out of any sale at public auction or at private sale of real or personal
property made by any sheriff of the parishes of this state, licensed auctioneer, or
other persons authorized by an order of the courts of this state, to sell at public
auction or at private sale, shall be prescribed against those claiming under such
sale that the lapse of two years from the time of making said sale, except where
minors or interdicted persons were owners or part ownership by said minor or
interdicted persons, the prescription thereon shall accrue after five years from the
date of public adjudication or private sale thereof.
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sale.2 These problems, however, are dealt with by courts of
equity, 3 and the decision to vacate or uphold a judicial sale is

largely left to judicial discretion. Lapse of time and acquies4
cence are but two elements considered in this determination.
The French are more protective of the original owner's property
right. The Code Napoleon has no separate treatment of judicial
sales corresponding to the Louisiana Civil Code's Book III,
Chapter 10, and deals with judicial sales under general sales
provisions. Since the formalities of judicial sales are adjective
law, their non-observance requires the adjudicatee to resort to
acquisitive prescription to establish clear title. Since the French
Code does not contain an article similar to Louisiana Civil Code
article 3543, the prescriptions of ten, twenty, and thirty years
are applied.5
The instant case illustrates the Louisiana approach. If the
procedural error is judged harmless, the short prescriptive pe2. 50 C.J.S. Judicial Sales § 42, at 659-60 (1947): "In general, the reversal
or vacation for irregularity or error of a decree for sale, made by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject and the parties, does not invalidate the title of a
stranger who bought in good faith at a sale while the decree was in force ....
However, the rule does not operate or apply where the decree for the sale was
a nullity; where the record shows that there was a defect of necessary parties
in the action in which the sale was ordered; where the purchaser was an attorney
engaged in the litigation, or an assignee of the judgment; where the appeal
was perfected before the sale was fully completed; or where the property sold
is owned by some one other than the defendant on whose account it is sold.
Likewise the rule that the title of the purchaser will be protected has been
held nat to apply where the purchaser was a party to the suit in which the sale
was ordered." Cf. Note, 22 LA. L. REV. 845 (1962).
3. 50 C.J.S. Judicial Sales § 52, at 670 (1947): "Courts of equity have a general supervision over judicial sales made under their decrees and may set aside or
vacate sales for cause, whether the property is bid in by the party to the suit
or by a stranger, even after confirmation and a conveyance to a bona fide purchaser. . . . Mere lapse of time does not affect the power of the court to set aside
or vacate a sale; but the question of the time within which a rescission should
be ordered may be considered by the court in the exercise of its discretion."
4. Id. § 54, at 673-74: "Since the law aims to uphold judicial sales, it follows
that the court, in exercise of its discretion will not as a rule set aside the sale
for mere informalities or irregularities, or slight, trivial, and immaterial defects
in the proceeding or causes which the parties in interest might with a reasonable
degree of diligence have avoided, especially at the instance of one who acquiesced
in the irregularities; . . . The court, however, may in its discretion, set aside a
sale irregularly made and order another sale, where the irregularities are such
as to have worked hardship, injustice, or unfairness, or have been coupled with
inadequacy of price ..
" Contra, Hicks r. Hughles, 223 La. 290, 304, 65 So. 2d
603, 608 (1953) : "[Aippellants argue that the Hughes heirs, by long silence and
acquiescence, are estopped from asserting title. It is well settled in our jurisprudence that mere silence and delay cannot cause a loss of title to property
except by the effect of the law of prescription. Consequently there is no merit
in this plea."
0. FRENCIL CODE OF CIVIM PROCEIU11E arts. 907-1002 (1806) ; 1 l'LANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE
LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2662 (1959) : "According to art. 2267, 'the title that is
null for want of form cannot serve as the basis of a prescription of from ten or
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riod of article 3543 is applied.6 If harm has resulted, or intent

to defraud is found, the sale is an absolute nullity and stricter
rules of articles 3474, 3499, and 9:56427 are invoked, subjecting the adjudicatee to all the suspensions attached thereto. s
Arceneaux v. Cormier9 held that a succession sale for less
than two-thirds the appraised value was not necessarily an absolute nullity. Standing alone, this was merely an informality
cured by the prescription of article 3543. However, if a substantive right was affected, and a just price was not received,
the sale would be void and ownership of the property could be
obtained only by acquisitive prescription.' Bordelon follows this
general rule, but it also gives meaning to the concept of "legal
bad faith," states that bad faith is not inherited by third-party
purchasers, and offers an insight into the questions whether tenor thirty-year prescription should apply.

The court in Bordelon equates legal bad faith with moral bad
faith. Thus when the formalities were purposely and knowingly
disregarded, the adjudicatee placed himself outside the protec-

tion of article 3543.
"The benefit of prescription under LSA-C.C. Art. 3543 is
available only to purchasers in good faith. This prescription
twenty years.' This ruling applies solely to solemn acts, such as donations and
testaments. They are the only acts that according to our law may be null for
'want of form. Should the ruling made by art. 2276 be extended to grounds of
nullity other than those of defects of form? The question is answered by drawing
a distinction. The extension is recognized as regards all cases of absolute nullity.
When a title is tainted with 'Substitution' it cannot be considered to be a just
title for purposes of prescription, because 'Substitutions' are rigorously prohibited
by art. 896. The same thing may be said of a sale made by a legally interdicted
condemned person or by the straw man of a dissolved congregation. On the contrary, the ruling given in art. 2267 is not extended to grounds of nullity that
make the act merely annullable. Thus titles that emanate from an incapable,
even if they be annullable upon his petition, nevertheless serve as a just title in
favor of the acquirer for the purpose of permitting prescription to run against
the true owner."
6. Sun Oil Co. v. Roger, 239 La. 379, 118 So. 2d 446 (1960); Granger v.
Hebert, 121 La. 1045, 46 So. 1012 (1908) ; Caldwell v. Hay, 170 So. 2d 194
(2d Cir. 1964) ; Comment, 13 TuL. L. REV. 615 (1939).
7. This statute, adopted in 1928, cures all errors in judicial sales. The prescription does not run against minors and interdicts. Also this prescription
applies "only where the owner knew that the sheriff was proceeding to sell his
property and where the purchaser or those claiming under him went into possession under the deed and remained in actual, open and peaceable possession as
See Tucker v. New Orleans
owner for five years." LA. R.S. 9:5642 (1950).
Laundries, Inc., 145 So. 2d 365 (4th Cir. 1962).
8. See, e.g., Buillar v. Davis, 185 La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936), in which a dispute was finally settled involving an unprobated will made in 1819. The court
had to resort to the Code of 1808 to solve the jurisdictional problem. LaCroix
v. Crane, 133 La. 227, 62 So. 657 (1913) ; Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux, 112 La.
906, 36 So. 800 (1904).
9. 175 La. 142, 144 So. 722 (1932).
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curing irregularities in a public sale is not available to a
purchaser in legal bad faith; in such latter instance, it is
immaterial whether the defects are relative or radical nullities because the bad faith purchaser at the succession sale
is in neither case shielded by the article's prescription . . .
the three brothers purchased at the sheriff's sale pursuant
to a conspiracy to defraud their coheirs and thus were not
purchasers in good faith ... the sale to them of estate lands
is subject to being nullified for their fraudulent conduct in
connection with the sale." 10
Considering legal bad faith as actual knowledge, usually coupled
with an intent to defraud, seems the only sound approach. Previous cases have used the term with vague connotations of constructive knowledge, 1 but any such construction defeats the pur12
pose of the code provision.
The bad faith of the adjudicatee does not pass to subsequent
purchasers. A third-party purchaser cannot be held responsible,
since he did not participate in the wrongful act. He thus may
invoke the prescription of article 3543.13 Even a subsequent
purchaser with actual knowledge of an informality would probably come within the ambit of article 3543. This follows by analogy to decisions concerning third-party purchasers in cases of
lesion beyond moiety, 14 and to judicial interpretation of the public records doctrine. 15 Chief Justice Slidell pointed out in Snoddy
v. Brashear,0 the reason for not holding the third-party purchaser responsible for his vendor's fraud is that annulment of
10. Bordelon v. Bordelon, 180 So. 2d 855, 858 (1965).
11. Arcadian Prod. Corp. v. Savanna Corp., 222 La. 617, 63 So. 2d 141
(1953); In re Union Central Life Ins. Co., 208 La. 253, 23 So. 2d 63 (1945)
Thibodaux v. Barrow, 129 La. 395, 56 So. 339 (1911).
12. This article is a "statute of repose" intended to quiet and give stability
to land titles and to create confidence in judicial sales. Dixon v. Federal Land
Bank of New Orleans, 196 La. 937, 200 So. 306 (1941) ; Phoenix Bldg. & Homestead Ass'n v. Meraux, 189 La. 819, 180 So. 648 (1938).
13. Bordelon v. Bordelon, 180 So. 2d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1965) : "A different
question is presented as to the subsequent assigns of these three original purchasers. . . . These subsequent assigns or purchasers did not, even under the
allegations of the petition, participate in the alleged fraudulent scheme. As to
them, as good faith subsequent purchasers, the prescription of LSA-C.C. Art.
3543 may prevent attack upon their title acquired through the court-ordered succession sale."
14. Morgan v. O'Bannon & Julien, 125 La. 367, 51 So. 293 (1910) ; Beatty v.
Vining, 147 So. 2d 37 (2d Cir. 1962).
15. Smith v. Taylor, 226 La. 235, 75 So. 2d 850 (1954) ; King v. Bickman,
105 So. 2d 301 (1st Cir. 1958).
16. 3 La. Ann. 569 (1848).
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a contract because of fraud is a personal action, while a suit for
return of immovable property is a real action."7
Third-party purchasers can prescribe under article 3543
against all informalities, 1 but not against absolute nullities appearing on the face of the public records. The court states in its
conclusion:
"The exception of prescription under Civil Code Article 3543
is overruled both as to the three brothers who under the
allegations were bad faith purchasers at the sale ... and also
as to both them and their subsequent assigns by good-faith
purchase, because of the alleged nullity of the succession sale
by reason of the inadequate price shown on the face of the
record by the sale for less than two-thirds of the inventory
value, together with the allegations that by reason of such
defect the sale was an absolute nullity because in addition
to the defect of a sale at less than the required minimum the
sales price was less than the actual value of the property
(such as should reasonably have been received at a fairly conducted succession sale at the time)."'9
The third-party purchaser is thereby protected from hidden
equities, and from fraudulent schemes that could not be discovered even by diligent investigation. In such cases he can obtain
full ownership of the property through the prescription of article 3543.20 However, this rule has one defect. The subsequent
purchaser has little to guide him in determining whether a sub17. Id. at 573. The Chief Justice in deciding whether an action to annul on
grounds of lesion should extend to third purchasers, takes cognizance of the fact
that the majority of civilian writers hold that it should. He decides, however,
that it was the legislative intent that the general rule should be changed because
the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code omitted FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1681
to confine the action of lesion to the original vendor and vendee. Although the
Snoddy case was decided after La. Civil Code art. 3543 was enacted, an equally
convincing argument can be made that the legislature intended that the action
to annul a judicial sale endured only so long as the land remained in the hands

of the adjudicatee, since art. 3543 was placed in the section dealing with liberative prescription, bk. III, ch. 3, § 3, pt. 3. The court further stated: "Nobody
will contend that the property passing into third parties' hands, bona fide, can
be affected by the error or fraud.

This, no doubt, is an exception introduced

for the security of titles and the peace of society; though the true and real
difference is to be found in this, that actions for the annulment of contracts on
the grounds of error and fraud are personal actions, while the action of lesion
is a real action - dolus re ipsa."
18. It left undecided the question of whether the prescriptive period should
begin from the date of the subsequent sale, or be retroactive to the date of

adjudication.
19. Bordelon v. Bordelon, 180 So. 2d 855, 860 (3d Cir. 1965).
20. Skannal v. Hespeth, 196 La. 87, 198 So. 661 (1940) ; Irwin v. Flynn,
110 La. 829, 34 So. 794 (1903).
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stantive right has been violated. In the present case the sale of
the land for less than two-thirds the appraised price is an informality, unless considering all the circumstances a so-called
just price is not obtained. To complicate this matter, the case
was remanded to determine if the estate was solvent. If the
estate was insolvent, no prejudice occurred to the plaintiff, and
the basic element of an absolute nullity disappears. This information could not be gleaned from the public records. Therefore
the purchaser of property that shows a defect of title resulting
from a judicial sale takes a title which is clouded until a judge
decides such questions as just price and prejudice of substantive rights.
The rule does, however, cast some light on the question
whether ten- or thirty-year prescription should apply. The cases
on this point are inconsistent, 21 but it is a logical corollary to
the instant case that when article 3543 is inoperative because of
the adjudicatee's bad faith or a radical error or absolute nullity
on the face of the records, thirty-year prescription should be the
proper rule to apply. In Bordelon, since two-thirds the appraised
value was not received and the inadequacy of the price was on
the face of the records, the plaintiff would not lose his right of
action for over fifty-one years. 22 On the other hand, if from
an examination of the records there appears only a relative nullity or informality, and it is subsequently discovered that a substantive right had been prejudiced, the purchaser who bought on
the faith of the public records has a just title for purposes of
ten-year prescription. Such a rule would give some standard
to a good-faith third purchaser to estimate his right and to
calculate his risks of loss.
Benjamin F. Day
MINERAL RIGHTS - TITLE CONTROVERSIES WITH THE STATE AND
ITS AGENCIES - SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

The common-law maxim -

the King can do no wrong -

has

been transposed in most states, including Louisiana, into a simi21. Pearlstine v. Mattes, 223 La. 1032, 67 So. 2d 582 (1953) ; Hicks v. Hughes,
223 La. 290, 65 So. 2d 603 (1953). But cf. Arceneaux v. Cormier, 175 La. 941,
144 So. 722 (1932).
22. Prescription would have been suspended by the minority of the posthumous
child for more than twenty-one years. Only after this could the running of the
thirty-year prescription begin to accrue. Tillery v. Fuller, 190 La. 586, 182 So.

683 (1938).

